What can we learn from historical pandemics? A systematic review of the literature
Abstract: What are the insights from historical pandemics for policymaking today? We carry out a systematic review of the literature on the impact of pandemics
Welcome to our archive of working papers, articles and monographs written by CEPH members.
This collection encompasses an array of themes and represents the cutting edge of the economic history discipline.
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Abstract: What are the insights from historical pandemics for policymaking today? We carry out a systematic review of the literature on the impact of pandemics
Abstract: How does housing policy influence the long-run distribution of population? We examine the impact on long-term population dynamics of the world’s first large-scale rural
Abstract: This article uses a prosopographical methodology and a new dataset of 1,558 CEOs from Britain’s largest public companies between 1900 and 2009 to analyse
Abstract: The Good Friday Agreement ended a three decades-long conflict in Northern Ireland. Peace has brought some economic improvements, including lower unemployment, higher wages for
Abstract: This paper asks whether history should change the way in which economists and economic historians think about populism. We use Müller’s definition, according to
Abstract: We introduce a new database of historical Genuine Savings (GS), an indicator of sustainable development promoted by the World Bank and widely used in
Summary: Nationalists think about the economy, Marvin Suesse argues, and this thinking matters once nationalists hold political power. Many nationalists seek to limit global exchange,
Abstract: Building wealth over lifetimes became possible for a broader span of the population in developed countries over the 20th century compared to any time
Abstract: This paper constructs a new chronology of the business cycle in the United Kingdom from 1700 on an annual basis and from 1920 on
Abstract: We study agency frictions in the United States Congress. We examine the longstanding hypothesis that political elites engage in conflict because they fail to