Abstract: We examine how the design of the patent system shapes firms’ access to finance. We exploit a UK reform that introduced substantive examination into the patent application process, improving the quality of information available to investors about the value of firms’ innovation. Using a newly compiled dataset of officially listed corporations, we find that firms with examined patents increased their borrowing, reflecting improved access to capital markets, which translated into firm growth. Our results highlight how patent examination can function as a screening mechanism that reduces information asymmetry, strengthens the signalling value of patents, and mitigates financial barriers to innovation.
Keywords: firm finance, debt, innovation, patents, patent examination, signalling
JEL Codes: G32, N23, N43, O16, O31, O34
Cite as: Stephen D. Billington, Christopher L. Colvin, Christopher Coyle, ‘Financing Innovation: The Role of Patent Examination’, CAGE Working Paper Series, Paper No. 767/2025 (September 2025), URL: https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/research/centres/cage/publications/workingpapers/2025/financing_innovation_the_role_of_patent_examination/
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